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SELF-HANDICAPPING AND MANAGERS’ DUTY OF 
CARE 
David A. Hoffman* 
This Symposium Essay focuses on the relationship between 
managers’ duty of care and self-handicapping, or constructing 
obstacles to performance with the goal of influencing subsequent 
explanations about outcomes.  Conventional explanations for 
failures of caretaking by managers have focused on motives (greed) 
and incentives (agency costs).  These accounts of manager behavior 
have led some modern jurists, concerned about recent corporate 
scandals, to advocate for stronger deterrent measures to realign 
manager and shareholder incentives. 
Self-handicapping theory, by contrast, teaches that bad 
manager behavior may occur even when incentives are well aligned.  
Highly successful individuals in particular come to fear the pressure 
of replicating past success.  To avoid the regret associated with the 
future failure that they anticipate, such individuals then create 
hurdles (through active or passive self-sabotage) or excuses.  When 
failure comes, individuals hope to shift attention from their personal 
merits to the handicap.  Research shows that self-handicapping 
“works.”  Indeed, managers in failing firms who self-handicap may 
escape with their reputations and compensation burnished. 
In this Essay, I summarize an extensive body of research on 
self-handicapping that surprisingly has not been well explored by 
corporate law theorists.  I then suggest that modern corporate 
scandals traditionally understood as products of failures of 
monitoring—like Enron—might be better explained, in part, as a 
function of self-handicapping by managers. This explanation 
supports recent efforts to move beyond a purely carrot-and-stick 
model of corporate governance.  Finally, I briefly discuss 
mechanisms to reduce self-handicapping by corporate officers; in 
particular, making them self-aware and selecting executives less 
prone to engage in this type of wasteful activity.  The law has a 
potential role to play in this process, but its proper focus is directors’ 
 
 * Associate Professor of Law, Temple University’s Beasley School of Law.  
J.D., Harvard Law School; B.A., Yale College.  Jane Baron, Craig Green, Peter 
Huang, Jonathan Lipson, Salil Mehra, and participants at the Wake Forest 
Law Review 2007 Business Law Symposium provided helpful comments on an 
earlier draft of this Essay.  I thank Julie George, Marcie Seiler, and Jill Thomas 
for research assistance. 
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negligence in hiring, not managers’ failures in taking business risks. 
Authors commonly introduce their works in symposium issues 
with a few disclaiming words.  They identify their scholarship as a 
“Symposium Essay,” not an “Article”; a “sketch” of an answer, not a 
fully fleshed out argument.  Casual readers might conclude that law 
professors are unusually humble and resist trumpeting the novelty 
and sophistication of their scholarship.1 
Social psychologists might instead believe that symposium 
authors seek to avoid reputational sanctions for publicizing 
arguments they have not fully worked out.2  Scholars try to signal 
an excuse for underdeveloped pieces: “I haven’t worked as hard on 
this paper as I would have if it were a ‘real’ article.”  The goal of this 
excuse making is simple: disappointed readers will attribute blame 
away from the author’s perceived acuity and professional 
reputation. 
This is a Symposium Essay about the psychology of creating 
such pre-excuses for failure.  Rather than focus on academics, I will 
examine the failings of overconfident corporate managers.3  My 
primary goal is to introduce legal readers to a well-known 
phenomenon from social psychology literature: self-handicapping.4  I 
will illustrate this behavioral bias by taking a close look at the 
fiduciary duty of care applicable to corporate managers under state 
law.5  As I will show, the prevalence of self-handicapping 
 
 1. But cf. David A. Hoffman, The Best Puffery Article Ever, 91 IOWA L. 
REV. 1395 (2006) (providing a general theory of exaggerated sales talk). 
 2. See generally Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situational Character: 
A Critical Realist Perspective on the Human Animal, 93 GEO. L.J. 1, 98–99 
(2004) (arguing that people tend to create “situational factors” on which to 
blame potential failures when they are unsure of success). 
 3. By “managers” I mean officers—those who run the day-to-day 
operations of the business.  See Lyman P.Q. Johnson & David Millon, Recalling 
Why Corporate Officers Are Fiduciaries, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597, 1621–22 
(2005) (explaining the distinctions between managers, officers, and directors). 
 4. Self-handicapping has rarely been explored in law reviews, with only 
twenty-two citations to the term in the Westlaw’s Journals database (JLR).  
Most work treats the phenomenon with respect to academic performance.  See, 
e.g., Barbara Glesner Fines, Competition and the Curve, 65 UMKC L. REV. 879, 
900 (1997) (explaining bad course selection as a self-handicapping mechanism); 
Denise Riebe, A Bar Review for Law Schools: Getting Students on Board to Pass 
Their Bar Exams, 45 BRANDEIS L.J. 269, 337–38 (2007) (discussing student use 
of self-handicapping to compensate for expected poor grades).  Others have 
discussed self-handicapping as a more general situational characteristic.  See, 
e.g., Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 2, at 98–99.  Only one paper, by George 
Triantis, considers self-handicapping in the corporate context.  George G. 
Triantis, Debt Financing and Motivation, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 1323 (1997).  I 
discuss that paper infra at note 56. 
 5. I pass over the implications of Sarbanes-Oxley, realizing that the Act 
(a) creates important federal duties for senior managers and (b) exerts 
gravitational force on state law, pulling it toward a regime of greater manager 
accountability.  See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 
745 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 
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complicates efforts to properly motivate managers to exercise 
optimal care. 
I begin by summarizing two familiar puzzles facing theorists of 
the duty of care.  In Part I of this Essay, I will explore these puzzles 
in greater detail. 
First, violations of the caretaking duty rarely produce monetary 
damages against corporate directors or officers.6  Shareholders 
possess a right to careful corporate stewards, but defenses like the 
business judgment rule (“BJR”), exculpation, and indemnification 
make the right’s remedy nearly illusory.7  Despite this illusory care 
regime, most directors and officers are careful most of the time.8  
This seeming paradox creates a familiar problem and a flowering of 
behavioral, legal, and sociological literatures explaining the 
presence and degree of care in the absence of sanctions.9 
Second, corporate fiduciary duties, like the duty of care, are 
almost never conceived of as applying simply to managers (as 
opposed to directors).10  So rarely have managers faced liability that 
it is unclear, at this late date, what substantive standards of care 
they face, at least under the default rules of Delaware law.11  Why 
 
U.S.C.). 
 6. See infra notes 24–29 and accompanying text. 
 7. Over time, the duty of care’s toothless maw has disgorged a bestiary of 
analogies.  See Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New 
Trends in the Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 
1078, 1095 (1967) (noting that liability for care would result in “the proverbial 
shaving of pigs—much squeal and little wool”); Lynn A. Stout, On the Proper 
Motives of Corporate Directors (or, Why You Don’t Want to Invite Homo 
Economicus to Join Your Board), 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 7 (2003) (noting that a 
“director is statistically more likely to be attacked by killer bees than she is to 
have to ever pay damages for breach of the duty of care”). 
 8. Stout, supra note 7, at 8. 
 9. See infra notes 52–56 and accompanying text. 
 10. Exceptions include Z. Jill Barclift, Senior Corporate Officers and the 
Duty of Candor: Do the CEO and CFO Have a Duty to Inform?, 41 VAL. U. L. 
REV. 269, 282 (2006) (arguing for an affirmative duty owed by senior officers to 
directors to inform them of material facts); Lawrence A. Hamermesh & A. 
Gilchrist Sparks III, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule: A 
Reply to Professor Johnson, 60 BUS. LAW. 865, 870–75 (2005) (asserting that the 
BJR applies to officers); Dennis R. Honabach, Smith v. Van Gorkom: 
Managerial Liability and Exculpatory Clauses—A Proposal to Fill the Gap of 
the Missing Officer Protection, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 307, 324–41 (2006) (proposing 
the expansion of exculpation for officers); Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Corporate 
Officers and the Business Judgment Rule, 60 BUS. LAW. 439, 440 (2005) (arguing 
the BJR “does not and should not be extended to corporate officers”); Johnson & 
Millon, supra note 3 (discussing the various fiduciary duties of officers); Cheryl 
L. Wade, Corporate Governance Failures and the Managerial Duty of Care, 76 
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 767, 770 (2002) (“Much has been written about the directorial 
duty of care, including analyses that distinguish standards applicable to inside 
and outside directors.  Much less has been written about the managerial duty of 
care.”). 
 11. See, e.g., Johnson & Millon, supra note 3, at 1631–35 (noting areas of 
uncertainty).  This uncertainty is less evident outside of the common law arena.  
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has such uncertainty persisted as a structural component of 
corporate jurisprudence, which usually values predictable outcomes 
to litigation?12  As importantly, assuming that the duty of care 
applies differently to managers than to directors, will managers 
take care in response to potential legal sanctions? 
Self-handicapping provides a new way of thinking about these 
long-standing puzzles.  It explains the “immunity” stance of the care 
doctrine: more legal sanctions may perversely increase negligence, 
not decrease it.  It also suggests reasons to believe that managers’ 
reactions to increased liability regimes are likely to be 
unpredictable, and therefore cautions against drastic changes in the 
current legal framework.  Uncertainty may be more powerful 
medicine for laziness than clarity. 
Self-handicapping behaviors are “impediments to performance 
that people construct to protect or enhance their perceived 
competence.”13  Individuals create such hurdles at specific moments: 
when they have succeeded in the past but do not know precisely how 
or why, and when they are confronted with a future task with 
implications for their egos.14  Under such circumstances, individuals 
sometimes seek excuses—either claimed or behavioral—that will 
deflect future attributions of blame (or success) away from 
themselves.15 
Corporate jurists should be interested in self-handicapping 
because the research challenges a dominant assumption that the 
law can effectively calibrate its deterrent effects on calculating 
managers and directors.16  Recent literature has modified this story, 
 
The Model Business Corporation Act (“MBCA”) has standards of manager 
conduct that are akin to those for directors, as does the American Law Institute 
(“ALI”).  See Barclift, supra note 10, at 279–80.  Similarly, many officers’ duties 
are mandated by their employment contracts.  See Johnson & Millon, supra, at 
1635 (noting the variations of duties for different officers). 
 12. See Honabach, supra note 10, at 307, 330–32 (noting the costs of 
uncertainty and suggesting that the uncertainty is a historic artifact of a time 
where officer lawsuits were rare). 
 13. Miron Zuckerman & Fen-Fang Tsai, Costs of Self-Handicapping, 73 J. 
PERSONALITY 411, 411 (2005). 
 14. For a general model of the relationship between ego and individual 
welfare, see Botond Köszegi, Ego Utility, Overconfidence, and Task Choice, 4 J. 
EUR. ECON. ASS’N 673 (2006). 
 15. The degree to which self-handicapping occurs obviously depends on the 
individual: none of the experiments discussed below observed self-handicapping 
in one hundred percent of subjects who were expected to self-handicap.  This 
problem is common in experimental psychology and cautions against aggressive 
interventions that might distort the behavior of otherwise rational actors.  See 
Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics’ Perfect Rationality Should Not Be 
Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics’ Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 
67, 83–119 (2002) (discussing the relationship between heterogeneous 
populations of experimental subjects and paternalism in behavioral law and 
economics). 
 16. See, e.g., Michael Kent Block et al., The Deterrent Effect of Antitrust 
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focusing on a culture of integrity,17 or the pressures of a corporate 
system in extremis,18 but the basic story of caretaking (as opposed to 
loyalty) has remained the same: lazy managers are either 
insufficiently motivated or scared.19  In Part II of this Essay, I will 
describe contrary self-handicapping explanations for negligence, 
focusing on several benchmark studies of interest. 
In Part III, I will connect these two literatures and suggest 
ways that self-handicapping helps to explain the current stance of 
Delaware courts toward managers’ duty of care.  I suggest that a 
psychologically realistic model of how executive negligence arises 
would be skeptical of a strong liability regime.  Finally, to the extent 
that law cannot fully deter misbehavior, I detail how corporations 
and jurists might work to ameliorate self-handicapping by 
managers. 
I. MANAGERS’ DUTY OF CARE 
As the organizers of this symposium have recognized, the duties 
of corporate managers have been long eclipsed in the law reviews 
and courts by those of their director overseers.20  The law’s curious 
 
Enforcement, 89 J. POL. ECON. 429, 438–39 (1981) (finding that enforcement by 
the Department of Justice reduced price-fixing in the bread industry); John 
Braithwaite & Gilbert Geis, On Theory and Action for Corporate Crime Control, 
28 CRIME & DELINQ. 292, 302 (1982) (arguing that “[c]orporate crimes are 
almost never crimes of passion; they are not spontaneous or emotional, but 
calculated risks taken by rational actors.”); Raymond Paternoster & Sally 
Simpson, Sanction Threats and Appeals to Morality: Testing a Rational Choice 
Model of Corporate Crime, 30 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 549, 571 (1996) (concluding that 
respondents were less likely to express an intention to act criminally if they 
perceived a punishment aimed at them); Sally S. Simpson & Christopher S. 
Koper, Deterring Corporate Crime, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 347, 360 n.23 (1992) 
(finding that firms convicted of antitrust violations reduced their future 
misconduct); Edward A. Snyder, The Effect of Higher Criminal Penalties on 
Antitrust Enforcement, 33 J.L. & ECON. 439, 449–50 (1990) (finding that the 
number of price-fixing cases fell following the elevation of sanction level). 
 17. Paternoster & Simpson, supra note 16, at 568.  But see John 
Braithwaite & Toni Makkai, Testing an Expected Utility Model of Corporate 
Deterrence, 25 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 7, 32 (1991) (finding that nursing home 
directors’ moral beliefs in following standards did not significantly deter them 
from noncompliance).  See generally Michael C. Jensen, Putting Integrity into 
Finance Theory and Practice: A Positive Approach (Harvard NOM, Working 
Paper No. 06-06, 2006, Revised June 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=876312 (discussing integrity in the corporate context). 
 18. Paternoster & Simpson, supra note 16, at 568–69; Sally S. Simpson, 
The Decomposition of Antitrust: Testing a Multi-Level, Longitudinal Model of 
Profit-Squeeze, 51 AM. SOC. REV. 859, 867–68 (1986). 
 19. See Pasternoster & Simpson, supra note 16. 
 20. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.  The director literature is 
itself rich, with varied views on how best to control director misconduct in light 
of psychological insights.  See, e.g., Renee M. Jones, Law, Norms, and the 
Breakdown of the Board: Promoting Accountability in Corporate Governance, 92 
IOWA L. REV. 105, 152–57 (2006) (suggesting a personal liability regime for 
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stance toward director liability—a strong fiduciary regime in theory, 
but an absence of real liability on the ground—has been fodder for 
arguments about the proper master of the board:21 the market or the 
courts.22  The rationales for focusing on the duties of directors are 
many, but reduce to control: directors retain the ultimate “legal 
trump card” to fire managers; therefore, the law should monitor 
directors, not their servants. 23 
This exclusive focus on directors’ incentives is costly.24  A 
suspicion of money damages for breaches of fiduciary duties arises 
(at least historically) from a worry about chilling entrepreneurship.  
As Chancellor Allen justified the BJR: 
[Directors] enjoy (as residual owners) only a very small 
proportion of any “upside” gains earned by the corporation on 
risky investment projects.  If . . . [they] were to be found liable 
for a corporate loss from a risky project . . . their liability 
would be joint and several . . . .  Given the scale of operation of 
modern public corporations, this stupefying disjunction 
between risk and reward for corporate directors threatens 
undesirable effects.  [O]nly a very small probability of director 
liability based on “negligence”, “inattention”, “waste”, etc., 
could induce a board to avoid authorizing risky investment 
projects to any extent!25 
This view that directors reap insufficient gains from corporate 
operations to justify the losses of litigation based on negligent 
stewardship is possibly obsolete.26  But even so, the financial 
incentives of directors are quite different from those of managers: 
the deficient-rewards theory seems particularly inapt when applied 
 
directors calibrated to their net worth). 
 21. A related question, of course, is whether the board or the shareholders 
are properly the master of the corporation.  For a heterodox view, see Stephen 
M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate 
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 563–74 (2003). 
 22. Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of 
Corporate Compliance with Law, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 71, 94–104, 118 
(noting that the stringent monitoring regimes imposed by law may reduce 
intercorporate trust and values, and recommending against putting too much 
weight on a compliance system in evaluating legal wrongdoing). 
 23. Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention 
Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 105 (2004).  Johnson and Millon challenge the 
legal control model as descriptively inaccurate: officers usually have power over 
directors by virtue of their knowledge, tenure, and the CEO’s position as 
Chairman of the Board.  Johnson & Millon, supra note 3, at 1617–20. 
 24. See generally Johnson & Millon, supra note 3, at 1605–27 (discussing 
corporate officer roles). 
 25. Gagliardi v. Trifoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
 26. Richard H. Wagner & Catherine G. Wagner, Recent Developments in 
Executive, Director, and Employee Stock Compensation Plans: New Concerns for 
Corporate Directors, 3 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 5, 8–9 (1997) (describing the 
increasing practice of giving directors stock awards or stock options as part of 
their compensation packages). 
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to managers who take large amounts of stock in the corporation as a 
form of compensation.27  For such individuals, the rewards for 
business risk taking are potentially quite rich, and the potential 
losses in litigation remote and hard to foresee.  To the extent that 
managers are protected by the BJR and exculpation—and it is 
unclear if they are—jurists must search for new rationales.28  
Nevertheless, corporate scholars routinely lump together the duties 
of managers and directors without further analysis.29 
There is a new and developing series of papers that do consider 
the duties and motivations of managers standing alone.  Oddly, 
most scholars in this managerial project concern themselves almost 
exclusively on the duty of loyalty.30  However, because this literature 
also sheds light on managers’ duty of care, I will briefly take a 
diversion to explain its main findings and conclusions. 
The rational choice model explains disloyalty as an agency cost: 
managers lack incentives and sanctions that align their incentives 
with the shareholders.31  Loyalty is a more serious problem than 
care, in this view, because it retards full disclosure and resulting 
market discipline.  Thus, the law punishes disloyalty by managers 
severely, denying such conduct the protection of the business 
judgment rule or exculpation.32 
By contrast, a recent strand of literature suggests that 
 
 27. See Bainbridge, supra note 23, at 117 (noting that outside directors are 
sometimes required to buy stock to help align incentives); Johnson, supra note 
10, at 458–59 (arguing that stock makes up a large portion of officer 
compensation).  But see Honabach, supra note 10, at 333–34 (arguing that the 
expected liability costs of modern corporate litigations would be beyond the 
means of most managers). 
 28. See Hamermesh & Sparks, supra note 10, at 874–75 (arguing that 
liability for managers would result in passing hard decisions to the board); 
Honabach, supra note 10, at 324–41 (noting that only seven states provide 
exculpation for managers, and suggesting several grounds for expanding 
manager immunity, including diversification). 
 29. See, e.g., ROBERT CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 3.4 (1986) (describing the 
duty of care as applying to “directors and officers,” but focusing discussion on 
the motives of directors); JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, CORPORATIONS 
800 (2d ed. 2003) (stating in the index: “Officers and Agents, fiduciary duties of. 
See Directors”); J. Gordon Christy, Corporate Mismanagement as Malpractice: A 
Critical Reanalysis of Corporate Managers’ Duties of Care and Loyalty, 21 
HOUS. L. REV. 105, 105 n.1. (1984) (“As used herein, the terms ‘managers’ and 
‘management’ refer to inside directors and senior executive officers who dictate 
corporate policy.”). 
 30. Why this should be is itself puzzling.  Negligence, not disloyalty, would 
seem to be the more common agency cost created by managers.  See, e.g., 
Christy, supra note 29, at 107–08 (summarizing the then state-of-the-art 
literature on management negligence). 
 31. See Pasternoster & Simpson, supra note 16, at 550–51 (summarizing 
literature on the rational choice model). 
 32. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 
180 (Del. 1986) (shifting the burden to the board given allegations of self-
dealing). 
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managerial disloyalty is a structural component of how corporations 
select executives.33  Professor Donald Langevoort, for example, 
illustrates how executives’ disloyal psychological character is a 
product of a tournament of selection that they must win to rise in 
the corporate pyramid.34  Executives attain their position by taking 
risks at successive iterations of a game in which the “finalists will be 
those risk-takers lucky enough to have avoided the predictable 
failures” that accompany business endeavors.35  The tournament 
inevitably produces overconfident managers.36  Similarly, because 
“conscience is likely to be a burden in a fast-paced, competitive 
setting,” managers winning tournaments will be “ethical[ly] 
plastic[]” and Machiavellian.37 
The implication of this behavioral perspective is that the 
amount of manager disloyalty is not only related to the extant 
deterrence regime, but also the CEO’s insecurity.  Langevoort 
predicts more dishonesty as the CEO perceives higher levels of 
threat to her incumbency by the board.38  She will “rationalize” bad 
news, “deflect responsibility,” and withhold information from the 
board as bad results accrue.39  Such responses suggest that audit 
controls (and the law generally) ought to be cognizant of CEOs’ 
increasing propensity to deceive as the pressure on their 
incumbency increases.40 
As I have suggested, this new managerial loyalty literature 
sheds light on managers’ duty of care.  Take, for example, new 
accounts explaining Enron’s fall (in part) as a result of managerial 
negligence: a “singular ineptness below the level of the board.”41  
That ineptness arose from (among other things) an unwillingness to 
 
 33. See Donald C. Langevoort, Resetting the Corporate Thermostat: Lessons 
from the Recent Financial Scandals About Self-Deception, Deceiving Others and 
the Design of Internal Controls, 93 GEO. L.J. 285 (2004). 
 34. Id. at 299 (introducing the idea of the tournament of selection). 
 35. Id. at 300.  For other work developing this tournament model, see Troy 
A. Paredes, Too Much Pay, Too Much Deference: Behavioral Corporate Finance, 
CEOs, and Corporate Governance, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 673, 684–85 n.41 
(2005) (summarizing the literature). 
 36. Langevoort, supra note 33, at 301. 
 37. Id. at 303. 
 38. Id. at 304–08; see also Kath Hall, The Psychology of Corporate 
Dishonesty, 19 AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 268 (2006) (discussing the various reasons for 
corporate dishonesty, including self-image, avoidance of “ego-threatening 
information,” and commitment to prior decisions).  Hall attributes a prominent 
Australian corporate scandal to executives’ desire to blame a deteriorating 
financial position on external events; screening out of contrary, ego-threatening, 
information; and strategic over-persistence.  Id. at 272–74 (discussing HIH 
Insurance scandal). 
 39. Langevoort, supra note 33, at 307–08. 
 40. Id. at 316–17; see also Hall, supra note 38, at 286 (suggesting that the 
law has to understand dishonesty to properly regulate it). 
 41. Deborah A. DeMott, Inside the Corporate Veil: The Character and 
Consequences of Executives’ Duties, 19 AUSTL. J. CORP. LAW 251, 254 (2006). 
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work on the “workaday, boring details.”42  In response to this 
negligence, Professor Deborah DeMott suggests a renewed 
commitment to a duty of care for managers: the law should 
“mandat[e] that an executive exercise care and diligence[]” and 
encourage officers to separate themselves from an organizational 
culture of slackness.43  This work parallels the rational choice theory 
of managers’ duty of loyalty. 
By contrast, Professor Troy Paredes has applied Langevoort’s 
tournament model to managerial caretaking.44  Overconfidence leads 
managers to “take excessive risks . . . even when they are acting in 
good faith and trying to maximize shareholder value.”45  Later, when 
such projects begin to fail, managers double down their bad bets, 
“creating distortions and inefficiencies,” if not “outright fraud.”46  
Paredes attributes overconfidence, in part, to the “atmosphere of 
deference” surrounding CEOs.47  He recommends that courts “take a 
tougher stance when enforcing fiduciary obligations under the duty 
of care.”48  This tougher stance would amount to scrutiny of decision 
making to look for debiasing by the board of CEO overconfidence.49 
Such different perspectives on managers’ duties have a common 
theme: the problem of care is largely external to CEOs, who are 
simply maximizing their self-interest as they see it.  As Langevoort 
states, unlike directors, “CEO[s] [are] highly motivated” by equity 
incentives, and that “power and status follow handsomely as well.”50  
Similarly, were the law to provide a better package of “sticks” that 
governed managers’ care, there would be less shirking, more 
attention to details, and better returns on shareholders’ 
investments.51  On this account, managerial negligence is potentially 
remediable through familiar devices: allocations of stock,52 targeted 
insurance and legal fees,53 social norms,54 and legal sanctions.55  
 
 42. Id. at 255 (internal quotation omitted). 
 43. Id. at 266; see also Johnson & Millon, supra note 3, at 1639–42 
(suggesting that conceiving of managers as agents will reinforce the duty of care 
and lead to less negligence). 
 44. Paredes, supra note 35. 
 45. Id. at 688. 
 46. Id. at 689. 
 47. Id. at 721. 
 48. Id. at 749. 
 49. Id. at 749–51. 
 50. Langevoort, supra note 33, at 297. 
 51. See DeMott, supra note 41 (explaining the merits of below-the-board 
duty of care); Johnson & Millon, supra note 3, at 1638–43 (noting the deterrence 
benefits of a renewed set of manager fiduciary duties); Wade, supra note 10, at 
785 (arguing that improved communication between officers and the board 
would encourage monitoring and improve shareholder wealth). 
 52. See, e.g., Iman Anabtawi, Secret Compensation, 82 N.C. L. REV. 835, 836 
(2004) (describing stock options as the “centerpiece of the vast majority of 
executive compensation packages beginning in the early 1990s”). 
 53. See, e.g., Peter Margulies, Legal Hazard: Corporate Crime, 
Advancement of Executives’ Defense Costs, and the Federal Courts, 7 U.C. DAVIS 
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Thus, scholars believe that the law has a motivational role: 
encouraging executives toward diligence by tying their egos closer to 
the corporation’s success.56 
II.  SELF-HANDICAPPING: A LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section explores the idea that managers may fail to take 
care for reasons that are unrelated to the proper setting of 
incentives and sanctions by law.  Shirking by managers does not 
occur simply because managers have too little at stake in the 
corporate enterprise, but in some circumstances because they are too 
involved with the corporation’s success.  That is: manager 
negligence may be a deliberate strategy to self-handicap.  I make 
this claim in two parts.  First, I describe the general self-
handicapping findings, its relationship to effort, and preliminary 
work on reducing self-handicapping in experimental settings.  
Second, I describe some very new work on corporate executive self-
handicapping and its relationship both to firm value and CEO 
compensation. 
A.  Self-Handicapping: A Literature Review 
Modern work on self-handicapping started in 1978 with a pair 
of articles by Steven Berglas and Edward Jones.57  Their basic 
 
BUS. L.J. 55 (2006) (commenting on the behavioral effects of advancement of 
fees). 
 54. See Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Norms & Corporate Law 
Introduction, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1607 (2001) (discussing how corporate norms 
shape conduct). 
 55. See, e.g., Simpson & Koper, supra note 16 (analyzing the effects of legal 
sanctions on corporate deterrence). 
 56. I borrow the idea of the psychologically motivational role of corporate 
law from George Triantis’s excellent essay on corporate debt and its 
relationship to the behavioral theory of learned helplessness.  See Triantis, 
supra note 4.  Triantis observes that debt is usually thought of as an important 
and immediate goad to care: “the consequences of missing a scheduled debt 
repayment are typically far more grave than those that follow a reduction in 
dividends or a decision not to repurchase stock.”  Id. at 1327.  However, the 
motivating effects of debt or equity depend on the “self-efficacy” of the 
individual manager: “a person’s judgment of her capabilities to organize and 
execute courses of action required to achieve designated performance demands.”  
Id. at 1334.  As Triantis further concludes, managers may fall victim to learned 
helplessness, which engenders self-handicapping.  Id. at 1341. 
 57. Steven Berglas & Edward E. Jones, Drug Choice as a Self-
Handicapping Strategy in Response to Noncontingent Success, 36 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 405 (1978) [hereinafter Berglas & Jones]; 
Edward E. Jones & Steven Berglas, Control of Attributions About the Self 
Through Self-Handicapping Strategies: The Appeal of Alcohol and the Role of 
Underachievement, 4 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 200 (1978) 
[hereinafter Jones & Berglas]; see generally Phyllis A Siegel et al., Reducing the 
Tendency to Self-Handicap: The Effect of Self-Affirmation, 41 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 589, 589–90 (2005) (summarizing the literature).  For a history 
of self-handicapping that explores its roots in the clinical and social psychology 
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experimental framework is now canonical.  Subjects volunteering to 
participate in an experiment were told that taking one of two drugs 
halfway through a two-round IQ test would markedly change their 
performance.58  One drug, Actavil, would supposedly “facilitate 
intellectual performance”; the other, Pandocrin, “was expected to 
inhibit or disrupt intellectual performance.”59  Finally, subjects were 
told that the IQ test was hard and that they should not expect to do 
particularly well.  In reality, the drugs were placebos, and the test 
only had one manipulated round, mixing impossibly hard and 
merely difficult questions.60 
The experimenters divided the subjects into two groups, later 
labeled (1) the noncontingent success condition and (2) the 
contingent success condition.61  They gave the noncontingent success 
subjects an impossibly hard test, but gave the contingent success 
subjects questions tailored to their ability.62  All subjects were told 
after completing the test that “Yours was one of the best scores seen 
to date!”63  Thus, Group 1’s success was not contingent on their effort 
and ability; Group 2, by contrast, might fairly believe that the test 
measured their worth.64 
Berglas and Jones then gave subjects in both conditions the 
choice of whether to take Actavil or Pandocrin before beginning the 
next round.65  Subjects could take a variety of doses of the drug, or 
none at all, “according to [their] own personal preference . . . [and] to 
what [they found] most interesting.”66 
Overall, seventy percent of the men in the noncontingent 
success group chose to take the Pandocrin drug, while only thirteen 
percent of the men in the contingent success group did.  For women, 
the percentages were forty percent and twenty-six percent 
respectively.67  (A later experiment suggested that the women 
attributed their success in both conditions to luck at higher rates 
 
traditions, see Raymond L. Higgins, Self-Handicapping: Historical Roots and 
Contemporary Branches, in SELF-HANDICAPPING: THE PARADOX THAT ISN’T 1 
(Higgins et al., eds., 1990). 
 58. Berglas & Jones, supra note 57, at 408 (noting that subjects who were 
drug abusers or unwilling to take drugs in an experimental setting were 
excluded). 
 59. Id. (noting that subjects were told that the predicted effects were 
uncertain). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. The experimenters ranked each question based on difficulty and gave 
subjects easier or harder questions depending on how they did on the previous 
one.  Id. 
 63. Id. (internal quotation omitted). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 409.  Some subjects had their scores publicized; other subjects’ 
scores were hidden.  Id. 
 66. Id. (internal quotation omitted). 
 67. Id. at 412. 
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than the men.)68  Self-handicapping theorists have replicated such 
drug experiments many times.69 
Why would individuals take a debilitating drug?  Berglas and 
Jones hypothesized that individuals in the noncontingent success 
condition felt a lack of control over a potential failure with a high 
ego impact.  They sought to avert self-doubt by shifting blame to 
outside factors (like the drug).  Thus, Berglas and Jones defined self-
handicapping as “any action . . . that enhances the opportunity to 
externalize (or excuse) failure and to internalize . . . success.”70 
Later theories tied self-handicapping to attribution theory, 
which explains when and why others attribute blame to our 
actions.71  Under that theory’s discounting principle, “failure under 
extenuating circumstances is not taken as proof of incompetence.”72  
And under the augmentation principle, “success despite obstacles is 
seen as evidence of especially high ability.”73  This suggests that the 
audience for self-handicaps may not be internal, as Berglas and 
Jones had suggested, but rather external.  It also suggests that it is 
the lack of control over outcomes, not the failure itself, which 
individuals fear.74  Later experimental work supported these 
 
 68. Id. at 416. 
 69. See, e.g., Frederick X. Gibbons & William P. Gaeddert, Focus of 
Attention and Placebo Utility, 20 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 159 (1984); 
Jalie A. Tucker, et al., Alcohol Consumption as a Self-Handicapping Strategy, 
90 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 220 (1981) (finding that male subjects drank more 
alcohol when they had no ability to practice to improve their performance in a 
non-contingent success condition). 
 70. Berglas & Jones, supra note 57, at 406. 
 71. See Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Juror Questions During Trial: A 
Window into Juror Thinking, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1927, 1957 n.63 (2006) 
(“Attribution theory focuses on how people arrive at causal explanations for 
events.”); Lesley Wexler, Limiting the Precautionary Principle: Weapons 
Regulation in the Face of Scientific Uncertainty, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 459, 508–
10 (2006) (“Attribution theory is a ‘general conception of the way people think 
about and analyze cause-effect data.’”). 
 72. Roy F. Baumeister & Steven J. Scher, Self-Defeating Behavior Patterns 
Among Normal Individuals: Review and Analysis of Common Self-Destructive 
Tendencies, 104 PSYCHOL. BULL. 3, 8 (1988). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Thompson and Richardson, for example, administered a commonly-used 
self-handicapping scale to experimental subjects.  Ted Thompson & Anna 
Richardson, Self-Handicapping Status, Claimed Self-Handicaps and Reduced 
Practice Effort Following Success and Failure Feedback, 71 BRIT. J. EDUC. 
PSYCHOL. 151 (2001).  They then divided individuals into groups and 
ascertained how much behavioral self-handicapping (taking practice problems) 
individuals with high and low self-handicapping traits engaged in.  They found 
that prior success did not significantly affect handicapping, but rather the lack 
of a relationship between effort, prior success, and future success.  Such a lack 
of relationship led, in their research, to helplessness and less practice.  Id.  But 
see Steven Berglas, Self-Handicapping Behavior and the Self-Defeating 
Personality Disorder: Toward a Refined Clinical Perspective, in SELF-DEFEATING 
BEHAVIORS: EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH, CLINICAL IMPRESSIONS, AND PRACTICAL 
IMPLICATIONS 261, 269 (Rebecca C. Curtis ed., 1989) (suggesting that self-
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attributive intuitions. 
In one experiment, male subjects were told that they were 
participating in an experiment to determine if either of two drugs 
(Actavil and Pandocrin, again) used to treat metabolic disorders 
would have a measurable effect on performance on an IQ test.75  The 
men were divided into contingent and noncontingent success groups 
using Berglas and Jones’s method.76 
Experimenters then allowed subjects to take their drug of choice 
in public (in front of the experimenter) or in private (when the 
experimenter was out of the room and allegedly would not know 
which drug the subject had taken).77  Subjects ingested either drug 
at a variety of dosage levels, based on preference.78 
Overall, forty-two percent of subjects in the public drug-choice 
condition chose the debilitating drug.  But only seven percent of 
subjects in the private drug-choice condition did so!79  That is, 
subjects exhibited self-handicapping only when others were 
watching them (and presumably would have knowledge of their 
excuse).80  This data suggests that the “presence of another person is 
a necessary condition for self-handicapping behavior.”81  Thus, self-
handicapping is best seen as a “self-presentation strategy.”82 
Why?  Conceivably, when we are watched, we are more likely to 
want to create public excuses for our looming failures, but in the 
privacy of our minds, excuses are less attractive. 
A different strand of research focuses on factors correlated with 
 
handicapping is marked by timing: “following a success and in anticipation of 
threats to the esteem gains derived from success feedback,” and that self-
handicapping occurs “only in response to successes deemed noncontingent” 
(citation omitted)). 
 75. Thomas A. Kolditz & Robert M. Arkin, An Impression Management 
Interpretation of the Self-Handicapping Strategy, 43 J. PERSONALITY SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 492, 495 (1982). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 497. 
 79. Id. at 499. 
 80. Id. at 500. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 501.  In another experiment, psychologists asked female subjects 
to work on an alleged IQ test.  Gibbons & Gaeddert, supra note 69, at 164–69.  
The women were provided with a drug that they were told hurt, had no effect 
on, or helped memory.  Experimenters assigned half the women to a cubicle 
with a mirror that faced them, and half to a cubicle containing a mirror facing 
away from them. The experimenters found no significant differences between 
reported ability, number of problems attempted, or percent correct in any of the 
different subsets of subjects.  However, women who took the (allegedly) 
performance-inhibiting drug and did not see themselves in the mirror believed 
that the drug was more inhibiting than women who did see themselves in the 
mirror.  Conversely, when the drug they ingested was performance-enhancing, 
such women disclaimed its effects more than subjects who were focused on their 
emotional state by the mirror.  Id. 
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increased levels of handicapping.83  I will focus on two such inciting 
variables: (1) insecurity and (2) beliefs about the innateness of 
intelligence.84 
There is a relationship between self-handicapping and self-
esteem.  Obviously, individuals with no self-esteem will have little 
incentive to self-handicap.85  Neither will individuals with a reflexive 
and strongly confident view of their abilities.86  Therefore, self-
handicapping is greatest when individuals have an “uncertain self-
evaluation.”87  In one experiment designed to test this view, Robert 
Harris and C.R. Snyder sorted subjects based on their reported self-
esteem, told them that they were to take an important IQ test, and 
suggested that practice would improve their scores.88  Harris and 
Snyder found that uncertain men practiced for the test less than 
secure men and insecure women.89  Such individuals reaped a 
benefit—less anxiety—from their failure to practice.90 
Second, a belief in “smartness” itself increases the likelihood to 
self-handicap.91  Some individuals believe that intelligence itself is a 
fixed commodity; others believe that it is fairly malleable.92  In a 
recent study, subjects were divided into groups based on their theory 
of intelligence.93  They were then asked how willing they would be to 
 
 83. See generally Elizabeth A. Self, Situational Influences on Self-
Handicapping, in SELF-HANDICAPPING, supra note 57, at 37, 38–53 (describing 
eliciting factors of self-handicapping). 
 84. A third important inciting characteristic is gender.  Research has 
consistently shown that men behaviorally self-handicap at higher rates than 
women, while women engage in claimed handicapping more than men.  
Zuckerman & Tsai, supra note 13, at 432 (reviewing literature but not finding 
the effect in a particular experiment).  The mechanism of this distinction is 
unclear, although recent research has theorized that men are working to protect 
their higher perceived status by creating excuses for failure.  See Jeffrey W. 
Lucas & Michael J. Lovaglia, Self-Handicapping: Gender, Race, and Status, 10 
CURRENT RES. SOC. PSYCHOL. (2005), available at http://www.uiowa.edu/ 
~grpproc/ crisp/crisp.10.16.html (finding that Caucasian men self-handicap at 
greater rates than women and minorities). 
 85. Berglas & Jones, supra note 57, at 406. 
 86. Robert N. Harris & C. R. Snyder, The Role of Uncertain Self-Esteem in 
Self-Handicapping, 51 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 451, 451 (1986). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 452–53. 
 89. Id. at 456. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See, e.g., Malcolm Gladwell, The Talent Myth, NEW YORKER, July 22, 
2002, at 28 (arguing that the fall of Enron was related to an overemphasis on 
innate ability instead of performance). 
 92. See generally Ying-yi Hong, et al., Implicit Theories, Attributions, and 
Coping: A Meaning System Approach, 77 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 588 
(1999) (connecting attribution theory to self-handicapping). 
 93. Subjects were given three statements, and asked to state their 
agreement with each statement on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to 6 
(strongly disagree).  The statements were: (1) “You have a certain amount of 
intelligence and you really can’t do much to change it”; (2) “Your intelligence is 
something about you that you can’t change very much”; and (3) “You can learn 
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take a remedial course that was crucial to their academic success in 
the social sciences.94  Participants were finally divided into two 
groups based on their previous high/low performance in the subject 
matter.95 
Overall, previous high-performing students were uniformly 
unlikely to be willing to take the remedial course.96  Poor performing 
students, by contrast, were divided.97  Those who believed in a 
theory of malleable intelligence were more inclined to take the 
course than those who believed in fixed intelligence.98 
A second experiment in this line connected theories of 
intelligence to self-handicapping.  Experimenters first prepped 
subjects to believe in a system of intelligence by reading a scholarly 
article stating either that genetics or environment predicted 
intelligence.99  Then, the subjects took a very hard IQ test.  Half of 
the subjects were then told they had done satisfactorily (at the sixty-
sixth percentile); half were told they were unsatisfactory (at the 
twentieth percentile).100 
Subjects had a choice: did they want to practice for the next 
round of testing?  Most individuals exposed to the theory of 
malleable intelligence chose to practice—around seventy percent.101  
However, those who were exposed to a fixed-intelligence framework 
divided sharply.102  Only 13.3% of the subjects who had done poorly 
in the first round and believed that IQ is innate wanted to practice, 
while two-thirds of the subjects who had done well wanted to 
practice.103 
 
new things, but you can’t really change your basic intelligence.”  Id. at 590.  
Individuals with mean scores of 3.0 or lower were classified as “entity 
theorists,” believing that intelligence is fixed, while those with scores of 4.0 or 
above were classified as incremental theorists, believing that intelligence is not 
fixed.  Those with scores between 3.0 and 4.0 were indeterminate, and those 
participants were eliminated from the study.  Id. at 591. 
 94. Id. at 593.  The course was English.  The subjects were Hong Kong 
university students.  Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id.  On an eleven-point scale, with zero being “certainly no” and ten 
being “certainly yes,” the malleable-intelligence, low-performing students 
averaged a 7.00; the fixed-intelligence, low-performing students averaged a 
5.62.  The comparable scores for high-performing students were 5.00 and 4.77, a 
statistically insignificant difference.  Id. 
 99. Id. at 594.  Shockingly, it appears that simply reading one or the other 
of these theories, and being tested on it as a “reading comprehension,” has 
effects on individuals’ beliefs about the relationship between intelligence and 
effort.  Id. (surveying previous research). This result suggests that individuals’ 
theories of intelligence are not particularly robust. 
 100. Id. at 595. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 595–96. 
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B.  The Self-Handicapping of Corporate Managers 
Theorists divide self-handicapping into behavioral and claimed 
excuses.  Behavioral self-handicapping is actually doing things that 
make subsequent success less likely; claimed self-handicapping is 
making excuses before the fact.104  Claimed self-handicapping is 
common: individuals claim anxiety, moods, hypochondria, or 
shyness before being evaluated (whether or not actually suffering 
such conditions).105  Behavioral self-handicapping falls into fewer 
categories: drug and alcohol abuse, setting unrealistic goals, and 
reducing effort.106 
Experiments examining effort are hard to design.107  Self-
handicapping experiments work by making subjects feel upset and 
helpless: loafing following such unpleasant experiences may not be 
calculating, but instead restorative.108  In one study working around 
this problem, subjects were separated into two groups: (1) some were 
told they were taking the Culture Fair Test of General Intelligence, 
a good predictor of success in life; (2) others were told that they were 
working on problems designed for a research class.109  Subsets of 
subjects were given easy sample problems, others hard ones.110  
Finally, before the “actual test” was to be administered,111 
experimenters distributed a questionnaire about the amount of 
effort the subjects intended to exert.112  Subjects in the “A” group—
those taking a test that would help to define their success in life and 
who had experienced hard sample questions—reported that they 
planned to exert significantly less effort on the second part of the 
exam.113 
Experimenters searching for a theoretical connection between 
self-handicapping and effort suggest that “a high level of effort 
makes an ability attribution for failure all the more likely.”114  That 
 
 104. Baumeister & Scher, supra note 72, at 8. 
 105. Id. (summarizing the literature). 
 106. Id. 
 107. An early work in this field is Arthur Frankel & Melvin L. Snyder, Poor 
Performance Following Unsolvable Problems: Learned Helplessness or Egotism?, 
36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1415 (1978). 
 108. Common examples are listening to music or watching television.  Cf. 
Tom Pyszczynski & Jeff Greenberg, Determinants of Reduction in Intended 
Effort as a Strategy for Coping with Anticipated Failure, 17 J. RES. PERSONALITY 
412, 413 (1983) (summarizing and criticizing earlier studies). 
 109. Id. at 415. 
 110. Id. at 415–16 (describing the method). 
 111. It never was.  Subjects were instead debriefed after taking the 
questionnaire.  Id. at 416. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 416–17 (out of nine points, the hard-test subgroup reported that 
they would, on average, exert a 7.30 in effort—the same as the subjects who 
were not taking an important test at all—while the subjects exposed to easy 
questions reported an intended effort of 8.55). 
 114. Id. at 420. 
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is: the harder you try, the more likely that failure will be blamed on 
your worth.  So there is at least some theoretical basis for 
understanding why corporate managers might shirk their duties 
when the law punishes a corporate failure with personal liability.  
This argument follows even though the actual likelihood of 
punishment is low: managers, subject to risk aversion, may 
overreact to low probability punishments that have extreme 
consequences for their self-image.115  Such punishments will link the 
executive’s ego and the corporation’s success ever more closely 
together, resulting in the risk that failure will be attributed to the 
manager.  The tighter this link—the higher the expected costs of 
negligence—the more executives may self-handicap. 
Another very recent study focused directly on claimed manager 
self-handicapping and its consequences for firms.116  Siegel and 
Brockner focused on the use, effectiveness, and market effects of 
external and internal handicaps presented in the annual letters sent 
by CEOs to shareholders as a part of the federal securities 
disclosure regime.117  External handicaps for these purposes were 
obstacles outside the firm: “increased competition, economic 
recession, or the rising prices of raw materials.”  Internal handicaps, 
by contrast, included: “restructuring, loss of personnel, and 
operating challenges faced by particular product lines or areas of 
business.”118 
In their first study, Siegel and Brockner asked business 
students to act as investors in a fictitious firm, and provided the 
students a 1995 President’s letter, financial information about the 
firm’s competitors, the firm’s performance from 1991 to 1994, and 
the firm’s “actual” performance for 1995.119  In one version of the 
letter, the CEO claimed external handicaps, in another, internal 
handicaps, and in a third, a mixed message.120  Various scenarios 
manipulated the firm’s prior performance and subsequent 
 
 115. A newly articulated cultural status model provides a helpful theoretical 
framework that explains why managers may fear the embarrassing prospect of 
liability for shirking: risks that affect an individual’s place within a group 
ranking are likely to be perceived as especially significant and odious.  See Dan 
M. Kahan et al., Gender, Race, and Risk Perception: The Influence of Cultural 
Status Anxiety (Yale Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, 
Working Paper No. 86, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=723762. 
 116. Phyllis A. Siegel & Joel Brockner, Individual and Organizational 
Consequences of CEO Claimed Handicapping: What’s Good For the CEO May 
Not Be So Good for the Firm, 96 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION 
PROCESSES 1 (2005). 
 117. Id. at 3, 6.  Previous work had found that this letter was the “most 
widely read part of the annual report,” and that there was “an association 
between the information content of the President’s Letter and firm-specific 
accounting and market-based performance measures.”  Id. at 6. 
 118. Id. at 3. 
 119. Id. at 5–6. 
 120. Id. at 6–7. 
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performance.121  Students then undertook two tasks: they priced the 
firm’s stock the day after the firm reported its 1995 financial results 
and offered a recommended change to the CEO’s salary from its 
1994 base.122 
The results of this experiment were surprising.  External 
handicaps influenced valuations of the firm and CEO compensation.  
They reduced firm value in all performance conditions.123  With 
respect to CEO salary, when prior performance was negative, 
external handicaps negatively affected the base salary,124 but when 
the prior performance was good, external handicaps resulted in a six 
percent net gain for the CEO’s recommended salary.125 
These findings led Siegel and Brockner to a market test: they 
looked at a sample of publicly traded firms in 1994 and 1995, coding 
each firm’s President’s Letters for handicapping traits.126  Using an 
event study analysis, Siegel and Brockner looked at the impact of 
later earnings announcements on firm value and on CEO 
compensation, specifically, the amount of the CEO’s bonus.127  
Holding all else equal, they found that external handicapping 
correlated with a decrease in firm value, but internal handicaps did 
not.128  By contrast, they did not fully replicate their experimental 
results for CEO compensation, although there was limited support 
for the hypothesis that external handicaps tended to insulate CEOs 
from market sanctions when their prior (good) performance was not 
replicated.129  That is, self-handicapping by CEOs seems to serve the 
classic goal of deflecting blame for failure.130  As Siegel and Brockner 
point out, these 
findings . . . raise a potential conundrum in that under some 
conditions, an external claimed handicap that is favorable to 
the CEO may be disadvantageous to the firm. . . .  [W]hen 
prior firm performance is good, the results . . . showed that 
external claimed handicapping had a positive effect on CEO 
 
 121. Id. at 7. 
 122. Id. at 7–8 n.1 (noting that the study thus was looking to perceived 
value, instead of investor behavior, but suggesting that investor predictions 
should closely correlate with observed stock prices). 
 123. In the external handicapping conditions, the average stock price 
predicted was $47.21; “in the absence of such handicaps, the average price was 
$48.21.”  There was no such effect for internal handicaps.  Id. at 9. 
 124. Specifically, holding the handicap condition constant, subjects 
recommended a 6.91% decrease in salary, but with the external handicap, the 
recommended decrease was 7.35%.  Id. at 10. 
 125. Id. (recommending a 4.90% increase instead of a 2.01% decrease) 
 126. Id. at 12. 
 127. Id. at 12–13. 
 128. Id. at 14. 
 129. Id. at 17.  As Siegel and Brockner acknowledge, investor views and the 
views of the boards of directors with respect to CEO compensation may be in 
accord only rarely.  Id. 
 130. Id. at 17–18. 
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pay, but a negative effect on firm value.131 
III.  HOW SHOULD THE LAW BEST PREVENT MANAGER NEGLIGENCE? 
A.  Negligence and Self-Handicapping 
Early in this Essay, I suggested that the doctrine of managerial 
caretaking results in two puzzles.  As I hope the reader will see, self-
handicapping sheds some light on both of these problems and 
suggests reasons to doubt changes to the law that would increase 
the expected sanctions associated with managerial negligence.  
Essentially, self-handicapping theory undermines the idea that 
more liability for managers’ shirking will result in more caretaking.  
The opposite may be true.  The theory also suggests reasons to think 
that managers are more susceptive to this perverse incentive 
problem than directors, because their success is so publicly linked to 
that of the corporation. 
In this Part, I support these conclusions in more detail.  Before 
doing so, I briefly observe that there are reasons to believe that 
managerial liability for negligence will be ineffective apart from 
those suggested by self-handicapping theory.  If managers are in 
truth rendered overconfident by corporate design, as Langevoort and 
Paredes suggest, it is hard to imagine that they would refrain from 
status-affirming activity (like entrepreneurship) simply because 
they face the uncertain sanction of the duty of care.  Only ten 
percent of drivers think themselves worse than the average:132 what 
percent of corporate executives would imagine they were grossly 
negligent? 
However, the optimism theory does not exclude the possibility 
that a targeted liability regime might result in more care.  In 
Langevoort’s model, if we believed that managers were optimistic 
but prone to negligence, we might increase the scope of the duty of 
care when the company’s financial condition was in decline.133  But 
such dynamic sanction regimes seem, in this context, costly to 
administer and easy to game.134 
Self-handicapping, by contrast, offers a more radical critique of 
the application of tort law to corporate executives.  Even a targeted 
tort regime may increase, not decrease, negligence.  To understand 
why, consider that a duty of care claim is less likely to be brought 
where the company’s shares have increased in value, because 
 
 131. Id. at 17. 
 132. Robert H. Frank, Why Is Cost-Benefit Analysis So Controversial?, 29 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 913, 929 (2000). 
 133. Thus, for example, the business judgment rule might only shield 
decision making made in profit-making quarters! 
 134. Donald C. Langevoort, The Organizational Psychology of Hyper-
Competition: Corporate Irresponsibility and the Lessons of Enron, 70 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 968, 972–73 (2002). 
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damages may be harder to prove.  But a company’s share price is 
highly variable: even managers who have successfully passed 
through the gates of the tournament of selection will not necessarily 
associate hard work with increased firm value.  They will realize 
that there are many factors in valuation—including many external 
to the firm that the manager cannot control.135 
Facing this noncontingent success condition, the manager has 
two defensive maneuvers close to hand.  We have seen evidence of 
the first: claiming external handicaps in disclosure documents, so as 
to deflect blame from the manager’s performance.  Such external 
handicaps do reduce firm value, but they may increase the 
manager’s own compensation.136  Indeed, the ubiquity of cautionary 
statements in securities disclosures, even before the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act’s (commonly known as PSLRA) 
safe-harbor provision, is evidence of prevalence of the self-
handicapping among even confident corporate executives. 
Managers may also begin to shirk.  Recall the newly articulated 
link between Enron and the duty of care.  Professor DeMott relates 
the story of Jeff McMahon, who succeeded Andrew Fastow as 
Enron’s CFO.137  On joining the company: 
McMahon . . . learned that Enron lacked any method with 
which to track its cash and thereby determine just how much 
cash the organisation had available to it at a particular 
time. . . . Said McMahon, “That’s impossible!  We’re a Fortune 
50 company.  We have to be tracking our cash.”  A company 
that did not track its cash was comparable to an individual 
who failed to balance his or her checkbook. . . . “[A]pparently 
Fastow had always thought that Enron would have more than 
enough cash to spare”, and, given that assumption, neglected 
to develop any cash-tracking systems.138 
This is a plausible account, and it supports DeMott’s defense of 
a powerful new tort regime directed at managers.  Enron’s officers 
(like Fastow) had shirked their responsibilities—out of laziness and 
disinterest—in favor of a focus on more interesting activities, like 
the “creative use of special-purpose entities.”139  According to this 
traditional view, a real, damage-based remedy for failures of 
managers’ duty of care may have prevented Enron’s fall. 
However, this account of Fastow’s negligence misses an 
important psychological component of his failure.  Self-handicapping 
theory suggests that Fastow would, in a sense, be happy about a 
story that blamed his failures on laziness.  Imagine a contrary story 
 
 135. See generally id. (discussing personality traits in highly competitive 
organizations). 
 136. Siegel & Brockner, supra note 116, at 17. 
 137. DeMott, supra note 41, at 255. 
 138. Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 139. Id. at 255–56. 
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about Fastow’s motivations, drawn from the same source: 
Andy Fastow was an “incredibly insecure man.”140  A graduate of 
Tufts and Northwestern Business School, Fastow had puffed his 
resume to land his first job at Enron.141  Although he lacked the 
“knowledge” to be Enron’s CFO,142 and was mocked within the 
organization for his lack of business ability,143 he had risen rapidly 
by virtue of his skill in manipulating financial instruments and 
betting (successfully) on the rise in Enron’s stock.144  Apart from his 
expertise in manipulating financial earnings, Fastow was not 
respected for his smarts: “He was a good average performer, but you 
weren’t held in awe of his intellect,” said a former boss.145 
Surrounding Fastow were Ivy-Leaguers led by Jeff Skilling, who 
prioritized innate intelligence above all other traits.146  Over time, 
Skilling came to rely on Fastow for increasingly dubious 
transactions involving highly complex accounting treatment that 
Fastow may have lacked the skills to fully understand.147  Driven by 
disloyalty and insecurity, Fastow increasingly shirked his 
responsibility as a CFO, leaving the details of Enron’s global 
financial position to others in favor of managing relationships with 
bankers.148 
This account, too, is incomplete and potentially misleading—
Fastow’s negligence and disloyalty ran hand-in-hand.149  However, it 
 
 140. BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM: 
THE AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON 139 (2003). 
 141. Id. at 134–37. 
 142. One insider suggests he could not “dissect a balance sheet.”  Id. at 140. 
 143. He was known within Enron as “Andy Fast-Out” for having been 
removed from a revenue-generating project after just nine months.  Id. at 138–
39. 
 144. Id. at 132–70. 
 145. Id. at 136 (internal quotation omitted). 
 146. Id. at 31 (relating the story of Skilling’s interview with Harvard 
Business School); id. at 55–56 (describing Enron’s meritocracy culture); id. at 
63–64 (describing corruption of the performance system). 
 147. Id. at 155–61. 
 148. Id. at 163–65 (describing Fastow’s manipulations of lenders). 
 149. I recognize that there are some risks in engaging in a “clinical” 
approach to the behavioral story of an enormously complicated event, like 
Enron’s collapse.  But, as Langevoort has pointed out: 
Though risky because single observations will not always conform to 
even the most well-established behavioral predictions, this exercise 
has the virtue of presenting a richly defined situation as a reality 
check.  From a legal perspective, this exercise can be used to evaluate 
that behavior—by understanding it better, we might become better 
able to assess its blameworthiness, for example. 
Donald C. Langevoort, Reflections on Scienter (and the Securities Fraud Case 
Against Martha Stewart That Never Happened), 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 2 
(2006).  Moreover, as Jonathan Lipson, who read a draft of this Essay, 
commented, Enron’s Special Purpose Entities were intended to generate cash, 
suggesting that Fastow was concerned about cash-flow.  The point of the 
alternative storytelling above is not to suggest that Enron fell because Andy 
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does capture a potential explanation for the lack of financial controls 
at Enron.  Enron’s sloppy bookkeeping may have resulted from Andy 
Fastow’s self-handicapping strategy.  Insecure about his intelligence 
and faced with a task (managing Enron’s finances) that ultimately 
depended for its success on the random walk of Enron’s stock price, 
Fastow might have decided to shirk—to fail to act when a 
reasonable manager would have—rather than have a later failure be 
attributed to his lack of intelligence.  This strategy has been partly 
successful: we conventionally describe Andy Fastow as greedy and 
criminal, but not foolish.150 
In short, managers who are grossly negligent may behave this 
way as a method of self-protection, not merely because the law 
insufficiently encourages their diligence.  Indeed, the self-
handicapping literature, when read as a whole, suggests that 
increasing the legal sanctions for negligence will have perverse 
effects: it might reinforce the link between executive ego and 
corporate success, making executives more, not less, willing to 
shirk.151  Considering the costs of imposing new legal duties on 
managers, we should consider whether other methods of control on 
caretaking are available. 
Finally, this potentially negative relationship between legal 
sanctions and care sheds light on the persistent uncertainty of 
Delaware law’s treatment of managerial duties.  Commentators 
have suggested that history and procedural accident explain the 
unresolved sources and scope of managers’ duty of care.152  But such 
contingent explanations are not fully satisfying.  Another possibility 
is that the law recognizes the psychological differences between 
managers and directors, and the possibility but not certainty, that 
sanctions are self-defeating for managers.  Uncertainty thus may 
provide a more efficient liability regime than we would originally 
have suspected. 
 
Fastow was too insecure to manage the books, but to illustrate how a more 
stringent care regime might have unintended and unfortunate consequences. 
 150. MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 140, at 150–51. 
 151. The point that incentives may act in perverse ways is not unique to the 
care problem.  See Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 
35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199, 211 (2006) (noting that certain types of “lazy or careless 
decision making” will be unaffected (at best) by incentive structures). 
 152. For example, until recently, the Delaware Chancery Court lacked 
jurisdiction over fiduciary suits against officers who were not directors.  See 
Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate 
Governance: Reflections Upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 905 (2003) 
(noting “hole” in Delaware law).  By statute, this “hole” was filled in 2004.  DEL. 
CODE. ANN. tit. 10, § 3114 (Supp. 2006) (Revisor’s note stating that the act 
became effective January 1, 2004).  Such suits are also traditionally understood 
as derivative, providing additional hurdles to recovery.  See Donald C. 
Langevoort, Agency Law Inside the Corporation: Problems of Candor and 
Knowledge, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1187, 1206–07 (2003). 
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B.  Ameliorating Self-Handicapping: Toward Rethinking Disney 
Over the short term, self-handicapping feels good.153  In sports, 
for example, self-handicapping (like lack of practice) may enable 
insecure players to enjoy physical activity instead of simply focusing 
on wins and losses.154  However, over time, studies have shown that 
individuals who score high on measures of self-handicapping are 
less healthy, confident, happy, and drug-free than those who self-
handicap less.155  Self-handicappers fail more in their jobs and 
education than those who do not.156 
In response, scholars have looked for ways to reduce the 
tendency to self-handicap among groups or in situations where it is 
common.157  This recently developing literature seems to have 
different strands: (1) changing how individuals think about 
themselves; and (2) changing how individuals react to others’ 
impressions of them.158 
For example, some experiments report that simply reinforcing a 
subject’s self-esteem reduces self-handicapping.159  This works by 
having subjects write about a value that they believe important to 
them (e.g., religion) in a short essay before having the opportunity to 
engage in self-handicapping behavior in a two-stage IQ test.160  
Doing so significantly reduced the likelihood that subjects would 
self-handicap.161 
A second way to ameliorate self-handicapping is to change 
individuals’ beliefs about how others will perceive their success and 
failure.  Preliminary work in this project has focused on grade 
schoolers.162  In a series of experiments, children praised for their 
 
 153. Zuckerman & Tsai, supra note 13, at 413 (summarizing literature on 
short-term effects of self-handicapping). 
 154. Roberta K. Deppe & Judith M. Harackiewicz, Self-Handicapping and 
Intrinsic Motivation: Buffering Intrinsic Motivation From the Threat of Failure, 
70 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 868, 872 (1996) (analyzing pinball playing). 
 155. Zuckerman & Tsai, supra note 13, at 431; cf. Deppe & Harackiewicz, 
supra note 154, at 874 (suggesting that self-handicapping may reduce the entry 
costs to difficult tasks and allow individuals to “build competence and gain 
confidence” over time). 
 156. Raymond L. Higgins & Steven Berglas, The Maintenance and 
Treatment of Self-Handicapping: From Risk-Taking to Face-Saving—and Back, 
in SELF-HANDICAPPING, supra note 57, at 187, 195–214 (discussing self-defeating 
self-handicaps); see also Zuckerman & Tsai, supra note 13, at 432 (reviewing 
the literature). 
 157. See generally Self, supra note 83, at 37, 53–62 (describing inhibiting 
factors). 
 158. Siegel et al., supra note 57, at 590.  Another possibility is membership 
on a team.  Id. 
 159. Id. at 590–91. 
 160. Id. at 593. 
 161. Id. at 594. 
 162. Claudia M. Mueller & Carol S. Dweck, Praise for Intelligence Can 
Undermine Children’s Motivation and Performance, 75 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 33 (1998). 
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intelligence after taking a test did less well on subsequent tests, 
enjoyed the experience less, and attributed failures to their innate 
worth, while subjects praised for their effort on the first test worked 
harder and did better, while attributing failure to lack of effort 
rather than worth.163  That is, praise for intelligence seems to result 
in subjects believing that their performance is connected to their 
innate smartness, and has pernicious consequences for future self-
handicapping.164 
The literature to date has not explored whether strategies like 
these might work for corporate executives.  Even if they did, the 
challenges to reducing potential self-handicapping in such 
individuals are many.  First, and most significantly, we need more 
research to determine when negligence by corporate executives may 
legitimately be termed self-handicapping, instead of a failure of a 
monitoring regime.  Empirical work in this arena will be difficult to 
design, although comparing identifiable markers of negligence, like 
restatements of financial results, with different regimes of 
caretaking across the states would be a place to start.  Also, further 
work on claimed self-handicapping in securities disclosures would 
prove useful and enrich recent debates about the appropriateness of 
the bespeaks-caution defense.165 
Second, to the extent that overconfidence is a structural aspect 
of manager psychology, it might be hard to generate concern about a 
psychological impediment that affects individuals with uncertain 
self-confidence.  However, this concern may be ameliorated by 
noting the imprecision of all behavioral research and the common-
sense observation that individuals who are exceedingly self-
confident in their public persona may be, in fact, quite uncertain 
about their own skills. 
Third, senior managers will have little patience for self-
affirmation sessions like those described above.  Suggesting that 
counseling will reduce managerial laziness is probably a 
counterintuitive idea to individuals socialized to believe that 
monetary incentives serve that precise function.166  As Jeff Skilling 
remarked: “This touchy-feely stuff isn’t as important as cash.  That’s 
what drives performance.”167 
Rather than focusing on managers, corporate jurists might 
 
 163. Id. at 48–49. 
 164. Id. at 50. 
 165. See, e.g., David A. Hoffman, The “Duty” To Be a Rational Shareholder, 
90 MINN. L. REV. 537, 587–88 (2006) (criticizing the bespeaks-action defense 
from a behavioral perspective). 
 166. There is one extant study supporting this view.  See Jeff Greenberg, et 
al., Effect of Extrinsic Incentives on Use of Test Anxiety as an Anticipatory 
Attributional Defense: Playing It Cool When the Stakes Are High, 47 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1136 (1984) (finding that financial stakes 
ameliorated self-handicapping in certain circumstances). 
 167. MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 140, at 55. 
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consider a debiasing approach.  As Professors Jolls and Sunstein 
explain, debiasing is “intervening in and altering the situation that 
produces the boundedly rational behavior,” instead of simply 
focusing on the “provision of financial incentives.”168  In the 
corporate arena, debiasing is most often accomplished through 
changing the structure of board decision making.169  Similarly here, 
the law could help companies to avoid handicapping managers by 
optimizing executive selection. 
Senior corporate executive personality tends to snowball 
throughout the organization.170  As the Enron example 
demonstrates, a single executive with a strong focus on innate 
intelligence can prove problematic for an entire company.  
Therefore, well-run corporations should select against this character 
trait and choose executives who believe that business acumen is a 
learned, and flexible, trait.  Similarly, executives could be tested 
based on their tendency to self-handicap using the self-handicapping 
scale developed by Jones and Rhodewalt.171  Indeed, psychological 
testing is an increasing part of the head-hunting process at major 
corporations, although firms have traditionally selected managers 
based on their political skills and ethical mindsets, and not these 
more care-related characteristics.172 
The law could encourage selection of managers with an eye 
toward self-handicapping.  To do so, the law might hold directors 
liable for hiring practices that do not (at least) consider an 
executive’s potential tendency to be self-destructive.  That is: the 
law should continue to treat negligence as a gatekeeping problem, 
but should be less hesitant to impose liability on boards.173  Rather 
than developing and enforcing substantive standards of care for 
business-related activities, a subject far outside judicial core 
competencies, courts would simply evaluate personnel decisions and 
procedures. 
The court in Disney obviously turned its back on such a 
 
 168. Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 1511, at 211. 
 169. Id. at 219. 
 170. Randall S. Peterson et al., The Impact of Chief Executive Officer 
Personality on Top Management Team Dynamics: One Mechanism by Which 
Leadership Affects Organizational Performance, 88 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 795 
(2003) (relating CEO personality to top management team dynamics using 
archival sources and case studies). 
 171. See Frederick Rhodewalt, Self-Handicappers: Individual Differences in 
the Preference for Anticipatory, Self-Protective Acts, in SELF-HANDICAPPING, 
supra note 57, at 69, 77. 
 172. See Karraker v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 2d 675, 677, 681 
(C.D. Ill. 2004) (describing the practice of requiring managers to take a 
personality test). 
 173. On gatekeeping, see Jill E. Fisch & Kenneth M. Rosen, Is There a Role 
For Lawyers in Preventing Future Enrons?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1097 (2003) 
(discussing the role of the corporate lawyer as gatekeeper). 
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substantive examination of the board’s role in hiring.174  It justly 
feared creating new avenues for liability and reducing 
entrepreneurship.175  But, ironically, in sanctioning negligent hiring, 
the court may have increased the pressure to monitor managers.  
Jurists seeking a remedy for corporate wrongdoing have been forced 
to look elsewhere: this very symposium is evidence that the renewed 
effort to prevent corporate fraud may result in calls for managerial 
liability. 
There are some problems with my proposal, which render it, at 
best, premature.  For one, what if self-handicapping traits were 
correlated with others that spark performance?  A liability regime 
might chill board innovation in hiring.  Additionally, we should 
perhaps resist a purely gatekeeping approach more generally: why 
not simply punish shirking itself, rather than its potential?176 
Further, I do not mean to suggest that we can cure managerial 
self-handicapping with a legal regime.  This Essay’s ambitions are 
decidedly more modest: (1) to introduce readers to the idea of self-
handicapping and to suggest its confounding relationship to an 
effective care regime; and (2) to provide new ways to defend the 
current (low-liability) stance of Delaware jurisprudence with respect 
to managers. 
An Essay with grander scope—one that was not cabined in by 
length constraints or the author’s own demerits—might suggest that 
the self-handicapping literature offers a challenge to tort law rules 
outside of the corporate context.  Law often purports to govern the 
behavior of successful, confident individuals through tort 
sanctions—attorney malpractice rules are another salient 
example.177  If the duty of care will cause corporate executives to 
shirk when it hopes to create care, might it cause lawyers and other 
professionals to do the same?  This is a potentially deep question, 
whose answer might unsettle some of our received wisdom about the 
deterrent effect of liability regimes in a commonly reoccurring 
context.  But I do not purport to answer it here.  After all, this was 
just a Symposium Essay. 
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